End of the Road for Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited!
Was India’s Steel PSU Betrayed by Its Own Politicians?
Is the 100% strategic sale of RINL the selling of family silver—or the killing of an institution?
The entire Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (RINL) episode evokes the words of Charles de Gaulle, who once remarked: “Since a politician never believes what he says, he is quite surprised to be taken at his word.”
And here we are.
After years of uncertainty, political theatre, loud assurances, shifting stands, and public posturing, the sun appears to be setting on Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (RINL)—the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant (VSP), long celebrated as the pride of Andhra Pradesh.
What we are witnessing today is not merely the end of a Public Sector Undertaking. It is the slow, deliberate dismantling of an institution—one built on sacrifice, struggle, and national aspiration.
The Political Theatre Before and After 2024
Before the General Elections of 2024, with the war cry of “Abki Baar Chaar Sau Paar,” the writing on the wall was unmistakable. The Central Government appeared firm in its intent to proceed with 100% strategic disinvestment of RINL, with no room for rethink or retreat.
However, the post-election arithmetic altered the political landscape.
The Modi 3.0 government required the support of new allies within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—notably N. Chandrababu Naidu (TDP), Nitish Kumar (JD-U), and Chirag Paswan (LJP)—to form a stable third-term government at the Centre.
Soon after, reports surfaced suggesting that the strategic sale of Vizag Steel Plant had been placed on hold due to pressure from coalition partners—particularly from Andhra Pradesh.
Assurances, Announcements, and Assumptions
On July 12, 2024, newly appointed Union Minister for Steel and Heavy Industries H.D. Kumaraswamy visited the Vizag Steel Plant and publicly sought to lay to rest speculation surrounding the strategic sale of RINL.
In the second week of July 2024, Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Nara Chandrababu Naidu categorically stated: “Visakhapatnam Steel Plant will not be privatised. We are committed to safeguarding it.”
These assurances were followed by prolonged discussions on alternatives—merger with SAIL, financial restructuring, and policy support. There were meetings, parleys, photo-ops, and press statements.
But the outcome was zero.
READ ALSO: Manish Raj Gupta – Director SAIL, Given Additional Charge as CMD of RINL; Ministry of Steel Sees Another Leadership Shuffle – Indian PSU | Public Sector Undertaking News
And Then Came the Twist
Despite repeated political assurances, the original decision of 100% strategic disinvestment remains unchanged.
An RTI reply has now reaffirmed what the political class chose not to acknowledge publicly.
The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) had granted in-principle approval for 100% disinvestment of the Government’s stake in RINL through strategic sale on January 27, 2021—and that decision stands unchanged till date.
On 18 November 2025, Padi Trinath, General Secretary of the Visakha Steel Employees’ Union, raised a grievance on the CPGRAMS portal.
The response, dated 9 December 2025, from Manoj Kumar, Joint Secretary, DIPAM, was unequivocal:
There has been no change in the CCEA decision regarding strategic disinvestment of RINL.
The union has now openly accused political leaders of misguiding the public with false assurances and misleading statements.
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant: A Legacy Born of Sacrifice- The story of VSP is inseparable from the historic mass movement “Visakha Ukku – Andhrula Hakku.” It was a decade-long struggle marked by:
- Loss of academic years for thousands of students
- Sacrifice of 32 lives
- Evacuation of 64 villages
- Acquisition of over 22,000 acres of land
- Initially estimated at ₹2,400 crore in the early 1980s, delays in fund release pushed project costs to ₹8,500 crore.
Unlike SAIL plants, which received Government of India investment as equity, RINL was burdened with loans and preferential shares, placing it under financial stress even before production began.
Most critically, RINL was never allotted captive iron ore mines, unlike every other major steel PSU.
A PSU That Paid Back—And More – Despite structural disadvantages, RINL:
- Began production in 1989–90
- Survived near-referral to BIFR in the mid-1990s
Was revived through timely intervention by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who converted loans into equity, financially, the record is telling:
- GoI investment: ~₹4,900 crore
- Returns to Centre: ~₹40,000 crore (taxes)
- Returns to State: ~₹12,000 crore
- Dividends paid: ~₹1,300 crore
- Turnover: ~₹1.5 lakh crore
- Cumulative profits: ₹10,391 crore
Yet, today, the narrative focuses solely on losses—without acknowledging why they occurred.
Why RINL Was Pushed to the Brink – The reasons for RINL’s current distress are well-documented:
- No Captive Mines
- Raw material cost: 63% of total cost
- SAIL: 48% | Tata Steel: 35%
- Costly Iron Ore Procurement
- Ore sourced from NMDC at market rates
- Annual loss: ₹800–1,000 crore
- Inferior Ore Quality
- Higher alumina content than DPR norms
- Reduced blast furnace productivity
- Policy-Driven Debt
- Nearly ₹18,000 crore debt for capacity expansion
- Expansion aligned with GoI steel policy
- Global Headwinds
- Dumping of cheap Chinese steel
- Cyclical global economic slowdowns
And none of these failures were of RINL’s making.
More Than a PSU—An Institution
And so, here we are—mourning not the end of a PSU, but the demise of an institution.
An institution which, had it been:
- Protected from systemic neglect
- Supported with policy parity
- Nurtured with foresight
would have etched its name permanently in the golden history of India’s steel PSUs.
Instead, what we are witnessing is the quiet burial of the pride of Andhra Pradesh, under layers of political assurances that never translated into policy action.
History will judge whether RINL was disinvested out of economic necessity—or betrayed by political expediency.
What is certain is this: The institution deserved much better.
We Report-You Decide…
